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Abstract
This paper associates political instability to real shocks a®ecting the
income of the median voter, in a two-period model where two political
parties set redistribution in order to defend the interests of well-de¯ned
constituencies. Implemented policies a®ect future voting outcomes and an
intertemporal trade-o® arises for the parties since their optimal one-period
strategy does not maximize the probability of being reelected. The higher
the volatility of the real shock, the more likely that parties deviate from
the optimal one-period strategy by choosing a conservative strategy, which
increases their chances of reelection and the expected lifetime utility of their
constituencies. (JEL D72, E62)
¤I would like to thank Jose'-Victor Rios-Rull for his help and encouragement. I have also
bene¯ted from comments and suggestions by Dirk Bergemann, Carlotta Berti Ceroni, Michele
Boldrin, Flavio Delbono, Miguel Gouveia and Ayse Mumcu. All errors are mine alone.
1. Introduction
What does political instability mean? How does it a®ect ¯scal policies and gov-
ernments' behaviour? Most economists seem to share the common belief that
political instability is a synonymous for political con°icts, turmoil and violence,
leading to uncertainty about future property rights which deters productive ac-
tivities and, in particular, investment decisions. This idea has found support in
a recent empirical literature (see Alesina et al. [3], Alesina and Perotti [4] and
Barro [8]).
However obvious it may seem, this argument needs some further speci¯cations.
In fact, the statement depends crucially on the de¯nition of political instability
and on its causes. For instance, in representative democracies political instability
can be related to the probability that the current government is defeated in the
next elections; if we assume that individuals have perfect information about the
type of policies that will be implemented by the successors, an increase in this
measure of instability does not necessarily lead to higher uncertainty about future
policies.1
The recent theoretical literature about politics and economics introduces po-
litical instability in order to provide an explanation for the observed cross-country
di®erences in ¯scal policies and for their suboptimality, especially with regard to
debt policies. In this literature, political instability occurs because voter partic-
ipation or the composition of the electorate may change and it entails a change
in the identity of the median voter. Examples of this approach can be found in
Alesina and Tabellini [6] [7], Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini [11], Persson and
Svensson [20] and Tabellini and Alesina [23].
1The meaning and use of political instability has been the subject of a volumi-
nous political-science literature. See, for example, Ake [2] and Hurwitz [14] and
the references therein cited.
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This paper aims at studying the relationship between political instability and
¯scal policies (in particular, redistributive policies) starting from a di®erent inter-
pretation of political instability. In particular, I associate political instability with
real uncertainty, developing the idea that, similarly to private economic decisions,
political outcomes cannot be exactly predicted because voters face real random
shocks which a®ect their opportunity sets. If rational and sel¯sh agents choose
policies in order to maximize their own indirect utility function, and the argu-
ments of this function have some stochastic components, electoral results become
uncertain and future policy cannot be perfectly anticipated.
A natural consequence of this approach is to relate the degree of political
instability to the volatility of the real shock. Thus, in the framework of this
paper, the higher is the volatility of the shock, the higher is the degree of political
instability and uncertainty.
In order to formalize these ideas, I develop a two-period model where:
1. there is only one policy issue (the amount of redistribution);
2. there are only two parties, Left and Right, with no free-entry;
3. parties are perfect agents of di®erent income groups;
4. the income of the middle class in the second period has a stochastic compo-
nent.
In our model, parties are not interested in being elected per se, as in the Down-
sian approach to political competition,2 but insofar as they have the opportunity
to implement the policies which are the most preferred by their constituencies.3
2See Downs [12].
3The importance of party's ideology in explaining macroeconomic policies has
found ample evidence in the political science literature. See, for example, Hibbs
[13] and Tufte [24].
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Equivalently, parties can be seen as citizen candidates who implement their pre-
ferred policy, if elected.4 Since the main purpose of the paper is to propose a
de¯nition of political instability related to real uncertainty, and study its impli-
cations on the choice of ¯scal policies, I kept the political system as simple as
possible. In particular, I take the number of parties as exogenous.
With regard to the economic environment, I will present a modi¯ed version of
Perotti [18] model about education and growth, where the author studies the long-
debated relation between income distribution and economic growth. Individuals
live for two periods and they are characterized by their human capital endowment.
Investment in education has a ¯xed cost and yields a ¯xed return. Due to the
lack of a credit market, an income at least equal to the ¯xed cost is required to
invest in education.
Revenues from a proportional income tax are redistributed as per capita lump-
sum subsidies. Since investment decisions are undertaken in the ¯rst period after
¯scal policy is implemented, the amount of redistribution a®ects the level of in-
vestment by altering the level of after-tax income accruing to each class. After
investment, some agents (in particular, the middle class) are hit by an income
shock: at the beginning of the second period, a fraction of them will belong to
the rich class; the rest will become poor.
Elections are held at the beginning of each period. Citizens perfectly foresee
the policy that would be chosen by each party and cast their vote for the party
whose preferred policy yield them the highest level of utility. The party that gets
the largest number of vote is elected and implements its optimal policy.
A crucial feature of this model is that expectations about future electoral
results are conditional on the current policy, which determines the future distri-
4For examples of the citizen candidates approach to democratic policy choice,
see Besley and Coate [10] and Osborne and Slivinski [17].
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bution of income together with the random shock. In particular, the left party is
most likely to be elected in the second period when the level of redistribution in
the ¯rst period is so low that only the rich invest, and the distribution of income
becomes right skewed. On the contrary, the probability that the right party is
elected is maximized when both the rich and the middle class invest.
Two are the main ¯ndings of this paper. First, when parties choose their
optimal ¯scal policy, they always face an intertemporal trade-o® between maxi-
mizing current utility of their constituencies and maximizing probability of future
reelection. Therefore, they may ¯nd intertemporally optimal not to reach their
constituencies' highest level of current consumption, if the gain in terms of prob-
abilities of future electoral success and future consumption is su±ciently high.
Second, this gain is higher, the higher is the variance of the real shock. Thus,
when the variability of the shock is large and the degree of political instability
is high, both parties are more likely to adopt a conservative policy whereby the
lower current welfare of their constituencies is traded against the opportunity of
capturing a larger percentage of future votes.
The last section illustrates these results through some numerical examples
where I assume that the random fraction of middle income agents who become
poor follows a uniform distribution with constant mean. By altering the support
of the distribution, I am able to evaluate the e®ects on the politico-economic
equilibrium due to changes in the volatility of the shock. These examples show
that the volatility of the shock can substantially a®ect the optimal policy of the
two parties and the results of the elections.
As I discussed earlier, this work is closely related to the recent literature about
endogenous ¯scal policy which attempts to study the relationship between polit-
ical instability and ¯scal policies. However, in this literature political instability
is identi¯ed with factors such as random voting turnout or changes in the com-
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position of the eligible voting population. Thus, electoral results turn out to be
exogenous and current policies cannot a®ect the probability of electoral success.
This paper is also linked to the literature that investigates the relationship be-
tween income distribution, political equilibrium and economic growth, even if the
role of political instability is not taken into account (see, for example, Alesina
and Rodrik [5], Krussel and Rios-Rull [15] [16], Perotti [18], [19] and Persson and
Tabellini [21]).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Sections 3
and 4 analyze the political equilibrium which arises in the one-period and in the
lifetime case. Section 5 studies the relation between the volatility of the shock
and the equilibrium ¯scal policies. Section 6 presents some numerical examples
and Section 7 concludes.
2. The model
I use Perotti [18] human capital accumulation model with some alterations to
characterize the relationship between real uncertainty, political instability and
¯scal policy.
The economy consists of an in¯nite number of agents who live for two periods
and who are described in their role as consumers, workers and voters.
Agent i belongs to one of three types and is indexed by his endowment of
e±ciency units of labor in the ¯rst period ni1, where n
1
1 < n
2
1 < n
3
1: Each type's
fraction is given by ¹i; where ¹i< 0:5 8i and
P3
i=1 ¹
i = 1, so that none of them
can dominate the elections, and the decisive voter always belongs to the middle
class. Furthermore, I assume that n21 < N1; where N1 denotes the average income
in period 1.
The utility function takes the form
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ui
³
ci1; c
i
2
´
= ci1 + c
i
2 (2.1)
where cit is the consumption of an agent i at time t.
The consumption good is produced using a linear production function:
yit = n
i
t (2.2)
where nit represents the e±ciency units of labor of an agent i at time t.
Investment technology is such that a ¯xed amount of consumption good ° in
period 1 yields a return of ½ units of good in period 2. The investment technology
is person speci¯c and there are no other intertemporal markets.5
In both periods there is lump-sum redistribution ¯nanced through a linear
income tax and the budget is always balanced.
On the political side, there are two parties, L and R, whose objective function
is to maximize the welfare of types 1 and 3, respectively.6 In each period, the
party in power chooses the level of taxation, ¿t. I assume that given ½ > °, there
exists an upper bound ¿ 2 ´
½¡ °
½
such that the tax rate in period 2 cannot exceed
this level. This assumption ensures that investing in education always yields a
higher utility than not investing.7
5This ¯xed-cost, ¯xed-return speci¯cation of the investment technology and the
lack of credit markets seem plausible when applied to investment in education.
6This political system captures the idea that "...Democrats are best serving
the interests of downscale groups and the Republicans are best accomodating the
interests of upscale groups" and that "the middle class is the battleground of
electoral competition between the parties" (Hibbs [13], p.214, 216). Examples of
economic models based upon this two-party system can be found in Aghion and
Bolton [1] and Roemer [22].
7In this model, we are not interested in the traditional time-consistency prob-
lems associated with dynamic taxation. Assuming the existence of an upper bound
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Parties cannot commit to future policies during the campaign; elections are
held at the beginning of each period, and the party which gets the largest number
of votes is appointed. Citizens vote sincerely for the party which maximizes their
expected utility.
Two points are worthwhile underlining here. First, agents' preferences over
tax policy depend exclusively on their income. Second, our assumption about ¹i
implies that in each period the decisive voter belongs to the middle class. Thus, in
order to formalize our concept of political uncertainty, I will introduce a stochastic
element which a®ects only the middle class income in the second period.
The law of motion of the individual endowment of the e±ciency units niis
given by:
ni2 = n
i
1 + ½e
i + "i (2.3)
where ei is an indicator function which is equal to one if type i has invested and
zero if type i has not invested. By assumption, the random shock "i is equal to 0
for types 1 and 3, whereas "2 is a discrete random variable which takes two values,
" and ". More speci¯cally, I assume that in the second period the "lucky" middle
agents have an income equal to the initial endowment of the rich class plus the
return from investment, if they invested. Similarly, the "unlucky" agents will end
up with the same endowment as the poor plus ½; if they invested. Thus:
n22 =
8><
>:
n11 + ½e
2 for the "unlucky"
n31 + ½e
2 for the "lucky"
Note that in the second period the only source of di®erence between the middle
class and the other classes is represented by the investment decision, e2: For
for the tax rate in the last period rules out the possibility of full taxation, which
would be the time-consistent solution for the left-wing party.
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example, if all classes invest, ei = 1 8i; and in the second period the middle class
disappears.
We can regard this stochastic element as an additive shock to the middle-class'
income in the second period. An alternative formulation would relate the stochas-
tic term to variability in the return to investment, but I chose this speci¯cation
because I want uncertainty to play a role even in the case where people do not
invest.
The distribution of the random variable "2 depends upon an aggregate shock
z; in particular:
P ("jz) = ®; P ("jz) = 1 ¡ ®
where 0 · ® · 1: By the law of large numbers, these ex-ante probabilities are
also the actual fractions of population which are either "lucky" or "unlucky". The
higher is ®, the "worst" will be the state of the world in the second period.
I will henceforth refer to the aggregate shock by means of ® instead of z, since
the two formulations are completely equivalent. The aggregate shock ®, where ®
represents the fraction of middle income people who will become poor, is assumed
to lie on the closed interval ­ = [®;®] µ [0; 1] and to be distributed according to
a density function f (®) ; assumed to be symmetric with mean b® and variance ¾2.
Finally, the lack of credit markets implies the following individual budget
constraints:
ci1 · (1 ¡ ¿1) n
i
1 + T1 ¡ °e
i (2.4)
ci2 · (1¡ ¿2)n
i
2 + T2 (2.5)
where Tt= ¿tNt is the amount of redistribution in period t.
The timing of the model is as follows:
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period 1: election ¿1 is chosen cons/inv decisions aggregate shock
period 2: election ¿2 is chosen consumption
In this framework, the only economic decision that agents have to take is
whether to invest in education or not. Therefore we can write:
The consumer's problem. In period 1 agent i solves the following problem:
V i (ni1; N1; ¿1) = max
ei2f0;1g
fci1 + E(c
i
2)g
subject to:
ci1 · (1¡ ¿1)n
i
1 + T1 ¡ °e
i
ci2 · (1¡ ¿2)n
i
2 + T2
(2.6)
where E (¢) is the expectation operator.
It can be shown (see Perotti [18]) that the solution to this problem is given
by:
ei =
8><
>:
1 8i s:t: ni1 ¸ en
0 8i s:t: ni1 < en
where en(¿1) is implicitly de¯ned by:
(1 ¡ ¿1) en+ T1 ¡ ° ´ 0 (2.7)
Given the tax rate ¿1, people whose initial endowment is higher than the threshold
level en invest in education; on the contrary, people whose endowment is below this
threshold are liquidity constrained and therefore they cannot invest.
In this context, the government can use ¯scal policy to a®ect the number of
people who invest, recognizing that changes of the tax rate a®ect the threshold
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level en: The way the level of taxation a®ects this threshold and the level of in-
vestment depends on whether the average income N1 is greater or smaller then
the investment cost °. In the remaining of the paper I will assume that N1 > °
and n21 < °:
8 We can see from (2.7) that in this case
@en
@¿1
< 0, i.e. the higher
the degree of redistribution, the lower the initial endowment which is required to
invest.
3. The one-period problem
As I already pointed out, in each period parties choose the level of taxation in
order to maximize the welfare of their constituencies. Furthermore, before that,
in each period agents vote to decide which party will be in o±ce in that period.
The political equilibrium in the second period can be characterized fairly easily.
Parties observe the level of income of their constituencies and they set the level
of taxation accordingly.
Thus, the problem of the left-wing party in the second period can be written
as:
'L2
³
n12; N2
´
= argmax
'22f0;¿2g
n
(1 ¡ '2) n
1
2 + '2N2
o
(3.1)
Similarly, the problem of the right-wing party is:
'R2
³
n32; N2
´
= argmax
'22f0;¿2g
n
(1¡ '2)n
3
2 + '2N2
o
(3.2)
Given that n12 < N2 and n
3
2 > N2; the solutions to (3.1) and (3.2) are '
L
2 = ¿ 2
and 'R2 = 0, respectively. Thus, we have shown the following:
8These two assumptions together imply that the rich invest regardless of the
level of taxation, whereas the middle class and the poor invest if and only if the
amount of redistribution is large enough to relax their liquidity constraint.
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Proposition 1. The optimal one-period strategy for the left-wing party is to
maximize the level of taxation, whereas minimum taxation is the optimal one-
period strategy for the right-wing party.
Let us now turn to the voting problem in the second period. As we explained
in the previous section, in this model agents cast their vote by comparing the
indirect utility associated with 'L2 and '
R
2 .
As we already know, in each period the decisive voter belongs to the middle
class. Note that, depending on the aggregate shock, the decisive voter in period 2
can be either a "lucky" or an "unlucky" one. Thus, if we denote by Ãk2 the party
chosen in period 2 by an individual k belonging to the middle class, we can write:
Ãk2
³
¿1; ®; "
k
´
= argmax
j2fL;Rg
n³
1 ¡ 'j2
´
nk2
³
¿1; "
k
´
+ 'j2N2 (¿1; ®)
o
(3.3)
Next, we need to order people by their preferred party, to ¯nd out who will win
the election in period 2. In other words, we are looking for m such that:
¹1 +
X
k·m
µk (®) =
1
2
(3.4)
where µ denotes fraction. Finally, the equilibrium condition requires that the
most preferred policy by m be the policy which is actually implemented, i.e.
'
Ãm
2
2 (¿1; ®; "
m) = ¿2 (¿1; ®) :
Let us now de¯ne ®¤ as the level of the shock such that ¹1 + ®
¤¹2 =
1
2
: It
is easily veri¯ed that, if ® > ®¤; the income of the decisive voter in the second
period is given by: n11 + ½e
2 and that if ® < ®¤ the income of the decisive voter
is given by: n31 + ½e
2: Obviously, if the decisive voter is poorer (richer) than the
average, the left (right) party will be elected.
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In the remainder of this section, I will show how the electoral results in the
second period can be in°uenced by the party in power in the ¯rst period. In order
to do so, we need some additional de¯nitions.
Let e¿ i1 denote the lowest level of taxation such that agent i can invest. In other
words, ¿1 = e¿ i1 implies en(¿1) = ni1, i.e. the threshold level is exactly equal to agent
i income. Using (2.7), we can write:
e¿ i1 = ° ¡ ni1N1 ¡ ni1 (3.5)
Recall, also that the liquidity constraint is never binding for the rich because
n31 > en(¿1) 8¿1 2 [0; 1] : Therefore, the lowest tax rate such that the rich can
invest is equal to e¿ 31 = 0:
As it will become immediately clear, the level of taxation in the ¯rst period
determines the subset of aggregate shocks such that, if the realized shock falls
in that subset, the left party will be elected in the second period, whereas if the
shock falls in the complementary set, the right party will be elected. Let ­L(¿1)
represent a subset of ­ such that when the shock takes value ® 2 ­L(¿1), the left
party is elected in the second period.
Consider now the case where ¿1 ¸ e¿11 : In this case, the amount of redistribution
in period 1 is so high that all agents have the opportunity to invest. Once the shock
hits the economy, a fraction ® of the middle class becomes poor and a fraction 1-®
becomes rich. Thus, in period 2 there will be only two classes: a poor class with
income n11 + ½ and mass ¹
1 + ®¹2 and a rich class with income n31 + ½ and mass
¹3+(1¡ ®)¹2: In this case, we can conclude that ­L(¿1 j ¿1 ¸ e¿ 11 ) = [®¤; ®] ´ ­1L:
Second, consider a decrease in the level of redistribution such that only the
rich and the middle class are allowed to invest, i.e. e¿ 21 · ¿1 < e¿ 11 : In this case, at
the beginning of the second period we will have three income classes, n11, n
1
1 + ½
and n31+½; with fractions ¹
1, ®¹2; and ¹3+(1 ¡ ®)¹2 respectively. It is clear that
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the left-wing party will be elected in the second period if and only if ¹1+®¹2 ¸ 1
2
(that is, ® ¸ ®¤) and n11 + ½ < N2 (e¿21 ; ®) :
If we now de¯ne ± 2 R such that for any ® · ±, n11 + ½ · N2 (e¿ 21 ; ®) ; we can
conclude that the left party will be elected if and only if the aggregate shock ®
will lie between ®¤ and ±, i.e.
­L
³
¿1 j e¿ 21 · ¿1 < e¿ 11 ´ ´ ­2L =
8><
>:
[®¤; ±] if ± > ®¤
; if ± · ®¤
Finally, consider the case where 0 · ¿1 < e¿ 21 . Here there is low redistribution
and only the rich can invest. Therefore at the beginning of period 2 we have three
classes, n11; n
3
1 and n
3
1+½, with fractions ¹
1+®¹2; (1¡ ®)¹2; and ¹3 respectively.
If ´ 2 R is implicitly de¯ned by:
n31 = N2 (0; ´)
then applying the same reasoning as before:
­L
³
¿1 j ¿1 < e¿ 21´ ´ ­3L =
8><
>:
[®; ´] [ [®¤; ®] if ´ < ®¤
­ if ´ ¸ ®¤
Summarizing, we have shown the following results:
Proposition 2. For any ¿1 2 [0;1], there exists a set ­L (¿1) µ ­, such that 8
® 2 ­L; the left party is elected in period 2, and 8 ® =2 ­L; the right party is
elected in period 2.
Corollary 1. For any ¿1 2 [0; 1] ; ­L (¿1) 2 f­
1
L;­
2
L;­
3
Lg : More speci¯cally,
­L(¿1 j ¿1 ¸ e¿ 11 ) = ­1L; ­L (¿1 j e¿ 21 · ¿1 < e¿ 11 ) = ­2L; ­L (¿1 j ¿1 < e¿21 ) = ­3L;
where ­3L ¶ ­
1
L ¶ ­
2
L.
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The intuition behind Corollary 1 is the following. On the one hand, when only
the rich invest, the distribution of income tends to be skewed to the right. If the
shock is so 'good' that the average income in the second period is high enough,
even the lucky middle agents will fall below the average and only the initially
rich will vote for the right party. On the other hand, when everybody invests
and there are only two classes, the rich together with the lucky middle class will
vote for the right party. Finally, when both the rich and the middle class invest,
the distribution of income becomes skewed to the left and, for bad shocks, it may
happen that the whole middle class will vote for the right party.
It is worthwhile anticipating here that, as we will extensively see in the next
section, the second part of Corollary 1 highlights the intertemporal trade-o® faced
by the parties between maximizing their short-run utility and maximizing their
chances of reelection. The next section is entirely based upon this result.
4. The lifetime problem
In this section I will characterize the optimal tax rate which would be chosen by
each party if it was elected in the ¯rst period.
In order to highlight the relationship between aggregate uncertainty and ¯scal
policies, let us ¯rst look at the politico-economic equilibrium which would arise if
there was no income shock and therefore no uncertainty at all. In this case, it is
easy to show the following:
Proposition 3. When there is no aggregate uncertainty, the left-wing party max-
imizes the level of redistribution in both periods and it always wins the elections.
Proof. Consider the policy vector ¿ = (1; ¿ 2); where the left (right) entry
represents the tax rate in the ¯rst (second) period: When ¿1 = 1; all three classes
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invest and the position of each of them relative to the average will be the same
in every period. Therefore, the tax vector ¿ maximizes overall consumption for
any agent who is initially below the average. Clearly, given n21 < N1; this policy
proposal cannot be defeated by any other proposal.
It should be clear that the last proposition depends crucially on the assump-
tion that, initially, the income of the middle class is below the average. In the
opposite case where the median voter is initially above the average, the result
of the proposition should be reversed, and the right party would always win the
elections by minimizing the degree of redistribution in every periods.
When we introduce real uncertainty, the maximization problem of the parties
changes. In fact, in the ¯rst period, they set the level of taxation in order to
maximize the expected value of their constituency's consumption, conditional on
the probability distribution f (®).
Thus, each of them will solve the following problem:
'1
³
nj1; N1
´
= arg max
¿12[0;1]
n
cj1 + E(c
j
2)
o
subject to:
cj1 = (1 ¡ '1) n
j
1 + '1N1 ¡ °e
j (¿1)
cj2 = (1 ¡ ¿2 ('1; ®)) n
j
2 ('1) + ¿2 ('1; ®)N2 ('1; ®)
(4.1)
where j 2 f1; 3g :
As we know from the previous section, the level of ¿2 will be either maximum
(¿2 = ¿ 2) or minimum (¿2 = 0) depending on which of the two parties is elected;
therefore, the expected value of consumption of agent j in period 2 can be written
as follows:
E(cj2) = n
j
2 ('1) + ¼ ('1) ¿ 2
hcN2 ('1)¡ nj2 ('1)i+ cov (¿2; N2) (4.2)
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where cN2 denotes the expected average income in the second period, obtained by
letting ® = b® and ¼ ('1) is the probability that the left-wing party is elected when
¿1 = '1: Using the results of the previous section, it is immediate to derive the
probability ¼ that the left party will be elected in the second period, given '1: In
fact, by integration of the probability function f (®) over the sets ­iL, we obtain
¼i =
R
­i
L
f (®) d (®) : Note that 0 · ¼2 · ¼1 · ¼3 · 1:
Let us now try to characterize the solutions to problem (4.1) for both parties.
Beginning with the left-wing party, let us ¯rst restrict the set of tax rates which
can be candidate for an optimum. Clearly, the one-period optimal solution ¿1 = 1
is a candidate also for the overall problem. Consider now a decrease in the level of
taxation. Lower redistribution reduces consumption of the poor in the ¯rst period
and, if the poor becomes liquidity constrained, it decreases their consumption also
in the second one. However, if the tax rate is lowered to a level where only the
rich invest, the probability that the left party is elected in the second period is
maximized and the bene¯t in terms of expected future consumption may outweigh
the loss in current consumption.
If we denote by ¿ 31 the highest tax rate such that only the rich invest, we can
conclude that ¿ 31 is the only other candidate as a solution to the overall problem
for the left party.
Thus, using (4.1) and (4.2), the problem of the left party reduces to:
'L1
³
n11; N1
´
= argmax
'12f¿31 ;1g
8><
>:
(1 ¡ '1) n
1
1 + '1N1 ¡ °e
1 ('1) + n
1
2 ('1)
+¼ ('1) ¿2
hcN2 ('1)¡ n12 ('1)i+ cov (¿2; N2)
9>=
>; (4.3)
If we compare the levels of utility which can reached by the left party when
'1 = 1 and '1 = ¿31, respectively, it is easy to show that, after some algebra, their
di®erence becomes:
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GL(1; ¿31) =
³
1 ¡ ¿31
´ ³
N1 ¡ n
1
1
´
+ ½¡ ° ¡ ¿2¼
1¹3½¡ ¿ 2
³
¼3 ¡ ¼1
´ hcN2 ³¿31´¡ n11i
(4.4)
If the left party decreases the degree of redistribution to ¿ 31, it incurs a cost in
the ¯rst period equal to the amount of resources which are not distributed to the
poor, that is: (1 ¡ ¿ 31) (N1 ¡ n
1
1) : It also incurs a cost in the second period equal
to ½¡ °; because at that level of taxation the poor are liquidity constrained and
cannot invest.
On the other hand, there are two types of bene¯ts. First, should the left party
be elected in the second period, a higher amount of resources will be redistributed.
Second, the probability that the left part is elected increase. These bene¯ts sum
up to:
¿ 2¼
1¹3½+ ¿ 2
³
¼3 ¡ ¼1
´ hcN2 ³¿31´¡ n11i (4.5)
Thus, we can summarize this discussion in the following:
Proposition 4. In the presence of real uncertainty, 'L1 = 1 if and only if G
L > 0:
Otherwise, 'L1 = ¿
3
1:
Let us turn now to the right-wing party. The right party has two di®erent
incentives to deviate from the optimal one-period strategy (¿1 = 0): First, as we
already know, the right-wing party increases its chances of reelection by increasing
the level of taxation. Second, the increased redistribution in the ¯rst period will
increase the size of the "pie" to be shared in the second one and it will decrease
the amount of income that the rich will loose should the left party be elected.
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This latter bene¯t is highest when the amount of resources to be redistributed in
the second period is maximized, that is when all three classes invest.9
Summarizing, there are three candidates as the optimal tax rates for the right
party: ¿1 = 0, ¿1 = e¿ 21 which maximizes its probability of electoral success, and
¿1 = e¿11 which minimizes the consumption loss of the rich in case of electoral
defeat of the right party.
Thus, the problem for the right party can be rewritten as follows:
'R1
³
n31; N1
´
= arg max
'12f0;e¿21 ;e¿11g=
8><
>:
(1¡ '1)n31 + '1N1 ¡ °e
3 ('1) + n32 ('1) +
+¼ ('1) ¿ 2
hcN2 ('1)¡ n32 ('1)i+ cov (¿2; N2)
9>=
>;
(4.6)
Looking at (4.6), consider an increase in the level of taxation from '1 to '
0
1: The
¯rst period cost for the right party is given by: A('1; '
0
1) ´ ('
0
1¡'1)(N1¡n
3
1): The
change in the second period expected consumption is the sum of two terms. The
¯rst term is equal to ¼('
0
1)[
cN2('01)¡ cN2('1)] and represents the increased amount
of per capita transfers in case the left party is in power in the second period. On
the other hand, the second term is given by [¼('1)¡ ¼('
0
1)][
cN2('1)¡ n31¡ ½] and
it is equal to the di®erent amount of "stolen" resources induced by the change in
the expected electoral results:
Let B('1; '
0
1) and C('1; '
0
1) denote these two terms, respectively. If we now
de¯ne GR('1; '
0
1) ´ A+B + C, we can write the following:
Proposition 5. In the presence of real uncertainty, ¿R1 2 f0; e¿ 21 ; e¿ 11g: The optimal
tax rate ¿R1 is such that G
R(¿R1 ; ¿1) > 0 8¿1 6= ¿
R
1 .
9The incentive to deviate from short-run optimal policies in order to increase
the total amount of resources to be redistributed plays a role in Perotti [19].
Note, however, that in our model this incentive is relevant if and only if there is
uncertainty about future electoral results.
18
To conclude this section, we need to analyze the voting problem in the ¯rst
period. Given the solutions to (4.3) and (4.6), the winning party will be the one
whose policies maximize the expected value of lifetime utility of the middle class
(i.e. the median voter). Similarly to (3.3), if we denote with Ã21 the party chosen
in the ¯rst period by the middle class, we can write:
Ã21 (n
2
1; N1) = arg max
j2fL;Rg
fc21 + E(c
2
2)g
subject to:
c21 =
³
1¡ 'j1
´
n21 + '
j
1N1 ¡ °e
2('j1)
E(c22) = bn22 + ¼('j1)¿ 2 ³cN2('j1)¡ bn22´+ cov(¿2; N2) + cov(¿2; n22)
(4.7)
where bn22 ´ b®n11 + (1¡ b®)n31 + ½e2 ³'j1´ denotes the expected income of a middle
class agent in the second period: Once again, the equilibrium condition requires
that '
Ã2
1
1 = ¿1, that is, the level of taxation in the ¯rst period must be equal to the
most preferred level by the middle class:
Notice that, when the expected income of the middle class is high enough, that
is cN2(¿ j1 )¡ bn22 < 0; the middle class anticipates to be hurt by future redistribution
and it may decide to support the right-wing party already in the ¯rst period (see
example 2 in Section 6). Indeed, this may happen if and only if 'R1 > 0.
5. Uncertainty and ¯scal policy
How does a change in the variance of the shock ¾2 a®ect the electoral results and
the optimal choices of the party?
In order to answer these type of questions, I will henceforth assume that the
mean of the distribution of the shock, b®; is equal to ®¤: In other words, the
expected value of the shock is such that, in the second period, the sum of the
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fractions of the poor and the unlucky middle class is exactly equal to one half,
which is obviously equal to the sum of the fractions of the rich and the lucky
middle class. Furthermore, I will restrict the attention to the cases where neither
of the two parties will be elected in the second period with probability one, no
matter what policy is implemented in the ¯rst period.10
Having introduced these restrictions, we can state the following result:
Proposition 6. The higher is ¾2, the higher is the gain in terms of probability of
future electoral success if parties deviate from their optimal one-period strategies.
Proof. For any ® · (>) b®; since the probability function is symmetric,
dF (®)
d¾2
¸ (<) 0: As we know from previous de¯nitions, ¼3 ¡ ¼1 = F (´) ; given
® < ´ < b® we get d (¼3 ¡ ¼1)
d¾2
=
dF (´)
d¾2
> 0: Similarly, note that (1¡ ¼2) ¡
(1¡ ¼3) = ¼3¡ ¼2 = F (´) + (1 ¡ F (±)) ; again, given ® < ´ < b® and b® < ± < ®;
we have
d (¼3 ¡ ¼2)
d¾2
> 0:
Proposition 6 follows from the fact that whenever parties move away from their
radical short-run strategies, they can capture the additional probability of success
in case the shocks at the tails of the distribution occur. The more uncertain is
the distribution of the shock, the higher the gain from this move. For instance,
consider the left party. As we know, the optimal short-run strategy is to set ¿1 = 1,
whereas the strategy that maximizes the probability of future electoral success is
to set ¿1 < e¿21 : Thus, the di®erence between its highest probability of success and
the probability associated to the optimal short-run strategy is given by ¼3¡¼1 =
10Notice that these assumptions imply that we are limiting the analysis to the
case where ®< ´ < b® < ± < ®: If we dropped these assumptions, the direction
of the response of the electoral results and the political equilibrium to changes in
the variance of the shock may become a priori ambiguous.
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R ´
® f(®)d(®). If ´ < b®; the value of this integral increases when the variance of the
shock increases. A similar argument holds for the right-party, where the di®erence
between its highest probability of success and the probability associated to the
optimal short-run strategy is given by ¼3¡¼2 =
R ´
® f(®)d(®)+
R ®
± f (®) d (®) which
is increasing with the variance if ´ < b® and ± > b®:
Once we have established the former result, we can look at the implications of
this result on the actual ¯scal policy which are chosen by the parties. In particular,
we can show the following:
Corollary 2. The higher is ¾2; the more likely that both parties will deviate from
their optimal one period strategy.
Proof. First of all, recall that
d¼1
d¾2
= 0;
d¼2
d¾2
< 0;
d¼3
d¾2
> 0: Let us consider the
problem of the left-wing party. From (4.4) ; taking into account the derivatives
above, we easily obtain that
dGL
d¾2
< 0:
In the case of the right-wing party, looking at (4.6) ; we can similarly conclude
that
dGR (0; e¿21 )
d¾2
< 0 and
dGR (0; e¿ 11 )
d¾2
< 0:
Corollary 2 shows that the larger is the variance of the shock, the more likely
that the parties will become moderate. Consider, for example, the left-wing party.
When the variance of the shock increases, the probability that a large fraction of
middle agents will be hit by the good shock increases. If the left-wing party
decreases the level of redistribution so that these agents are not allowed to invest,
their future income may be lower that the future average income and they may
end up voting for the left party. Similarly, a higher volatility of the shock induces
the right-wing party to move away from its radical one-period optimal strategy
and to become moderate.
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In the next section, I will construct some numerical examples where, for high
enough values of ¾2; the right-wing party optimal strategy will be given by ¿1 = e¿21 :
It will be also shown that this "moderate" strategy may cause the right party to
win the elections in the ¯rst period, although the median voter in that period is
poorer than the average (see example 2 in the next section).
6. Some examples
This section presents two examples, where I assume that the random variable
® 2 [®;®] follows a uniform distribution with mean b® and variance ¾2: In these
exercises, I will keep the mean constant and allow the variance to vary by changing
the support of the distribution.
The solutions to the lifetime maximization problems of the two parties are
shown in tables 1 to 6. Entries in the tables represent the expected value of the
lifetime utility of each party's constituencies (that is, the poor and the rich), for
given ¿1 (rows) and ¾
2 (columns). For instance, let us consider the case of the
left party. The ¯rst row in table 1 shows the values of the expected utility for the
poor when ¿1 = 1, whereas the second row shows these values when ¿1 = ¿
3
1 (see
(4.3)). Similarly, in the case of the right party, the three rows in table 2 show the
value of the expected utility of the rich when ¿1 = 0; ¿1 = e¿ 21 ; ¿1 = e¿ 11 , respectively
(see eq.(4.6)). Clearly, for each value of the variance (column), parties will choose
the level of taxation which corresponds to the highest entry.
Tables 3 shows the electoral results in the ¯rst period. According to (4.7), in
order to decide which party will win the elections in the ¯rst period, we have to
compare the indirect utility of the middle class for the di®erent policies chosen by
the two parties.
The ¯rst example, which will be treated as the baseline case, assumes that the
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parameters of the models take the following values:
The Baseline Case
¹1 ¹2 ¹3 n
1
1 n
2
1 n
3
1 ½ °
0.35 0.45 0.2 0.25 0.35 1.4 1.45 0.4
In this case, we will look at the political equilibria for three di®erent values of
the variance of the shock:
³
¾2s
´
=
µ
0:006 0:018 0:037
¶
where s = 1;2; 3: For each value of ¾2; we calculated the probabilities of suc-
cess of the left party ¼1; ¼2; ¼3 using the procedure described in section 3. The
probabilities turned out to be equal to:
¦ = (¼is) =
0
BBBBB@
0:5 0:5 0:5
0:489 0:28 0:196
0:5 0:5 0:5
1
CCCCCA
where ¼is = ¼
i when ¾2 = ¾2s with i; s 2 f1; 2; 3g:
For this example, the political equilibrium is described by tables 1; 2; and 3.
First of all, note that all entries in the ¯rst row of table 1 are higher than those
in the second row. Thus, the left party always chooses ¿1 = 1 for any level of the
variance.11 On the other hand, as table 2 shows, the right party sets ¿1 = 0 when
¾2 = 0:006; but it moves to ¿1 = e¿ 21 = 0:286 when ¾2 = 0:018 and ¾2 = 0:037;
in order to capture a large increase in the probability of reelection.12 However,
from table 3 we can conlcude that the median voter always votes in favor of the
left-wing party, even when the right party chooses the higher tax rate.
11In these examples, ¼3 is always equal to ¼1: Therefore, there is no reason for
the left party to decrease the level of taxation.
12Recall that e¿ 21 is calculated using (3.5) where i = 2:
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Let us now construct another example. In particular, example 2 alters the
fractions of the poor and the rich agents so that ¹1 = 0:39 and ¹3 = 0:18: In this
case, we study the political equilibrium for the following values of the variance of
the shock:
³
¾2s
´
=
µ
0:006 0:013 0:02
¶
The corresponding probabilities are:
¦0 =
³
¼
0
is
´
=
0
BBBBB@
0:5 0:5 0:5
0:068 0:047 0:038
0:5 0:5 0:5
1
CCCCCA
The new political equilibrium is now described by tables 4; 5 and 6: It is
immediate to notice that, in this example, when the variance of the shock is
equal to 0:02, not only the right-wing party chooses a positive level of taxation
e¿ 21 = 0:388, but it also wins the election in the ¯rst period and it is almost sure
to be reelected in the second one, given ¼
0
23 = 0:038:
7. Conclusion
This paper links political instability to aggregate uncertainty in a two-period
model where two political parties choose the level of redistribution in order to
maximize the welfare of their constituencies. The electoral results in the second
period depend on the median voter's income which, in turn, depends on both the
realization of an aggregate shock and the policy which was implemented in the
¯rst period.
In the absence of the random shock, or if parties were dictators, they would
replicate the same strategy over time: a left-wing dictator would always max-
imize the amount of redistribution, whereas a right-wing dictator would always
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minimizes it. However, when the real aggregate shock is introduced, other politico-
economic equilibria may arise and this work analyzes how do they depend on the
volatility of the shock.
The main results of the paper are the following. First, we show that the
optimal radical policies, which would be chosen by the parties in the dictatorship
case, induce a future distribution of income which is not the most favorable for
their future reelection. Therefore, an intertemporal trade-o® arises for the parties
between maximizing current utility and maximizing the probability of electoral
success. Second, the higher the volatility of the shock, the higher the increase in
the probability of electoral success if parties move from their short-run optimal
policies to a more conservative policy.
Section 6 presents two numerical exercises that are performed in order to
illustrate these results. The aggregate shock is assumed to follow a uniform dis-
tribution with constant mean; instead, the variance is allowed to change through
variations of the support of the distribution. These examples show how changes
of the variance of the shock may substantially a®ect the politico-economic equilib-
rium. In fact, in both examples, when the volatility is high enough, the optimal
level of redistribution for the right party changes from zero to a positive level;
moreover, in the second example, the electoral results change as a consequence of
the increased volatility.
An interesting extension of this work would be to incorporate the analysis in a
more dynamic setting, in order to study the relationship between real uncertainty,
political uncertainty, and economic growth. This line of research is missing in
most of the recent literature about endogenous ¯scal policy and growth, where
the distribution of income is stable over time and there cannot be any shift in the
winning majority (see, for example, Alesina and Rodrik [5], Bertola [9], Persson
and Tabellini [21]).
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In a overlapping generations structure, con°icts of interests between agents
of di®erent ages belonging to the same class may arise. It would therefore be
interesting to analyze a politico-economic model with both inter and intra-classes
con°icts, even though computing dynamic political equilibria with agents' hetero-
geneity is usually a complicated task (see Krusell and Rios-Rull [15]).
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Example 1
Table 1: The Left-Wing Party
2.033 2.033 2.033
0.892 0.892 0.892
Table 2: The Right-Wing Party
3.222 3.222 3.222
3.217 3.381 3.447
3.165 3.165 3.165
Table 3: The Electoral Results
Left Left Left
Example 2
Table 4: The Left-Wing Party
1.987 1.987 1.987
0.881 0.881 0.881
Table 5: The Right-Wing Party
3.201 3.201 3.201
3.437 3.454 3.462
3.039 3.039 3.039
Table 6: The Electoral Results
Left Left Right
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